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Abstract 
Between 2005 and 2006 it came to be known that over 200 people had been wrongfully detained in Australian 
immigration detention centres, of whom, 13 were people with a disability. A review of the subsequent 
Commonwealth Ombudsman Reports into the wrongful detentions exposed an organizational culture in which 
othered voices were discredited and disregarded, an over- willingness to detain a person and a lack of proper 
oversight of these powers. This paper explores these reports and argues that proper investigation needs to go 
beyond organizational culture and to look also at historical, social, political and cultural forces shaping 
Australia’s use of immigration detention. The authors propose that the intersection of disability and race 
leaves people vulnerable to human rights violations primarily because this is also the intersection of both 
racial and rational prejudices of the dominant hegemony. 
 









On Wednesday evening 28 August 2002 a middle-aged man originally from East Timor known as Mr G was 
arrested by Fremantle Police as he was sleeping on the verandah of a private home. Mr G had lived in 
Fremantle, Western Australia for 25 years and was well known amongst the Fremantle community and the 
East Timorese community. He had chronic schizophrenia and had been on a disability pension on the basis of 
an ‘intellectual disability’ since 1996.  
 
When questioned by police Mr G was unable to give clear and consistent information about his identity, and 
although he was carrying a Commonwealth Bank book with his correct name, the police were unable to 
satisfy themselves of his correct identity. They called the afterhours immigration officer at Perth international 
airport who conducted a database search under an incorrect name and, without interviewing Mr G either in 
person or by telephone, formed a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that Mr G was an unlawful non-citizen and ordered 
his detention. 
 
In spite of several interventions from the East Timorese community Mr G was held in detention for 43 days. 
He was released on 9 October 2002 when the Immigration Department1 determined that he was in fact a 
lawful permanent resident. 
 
Introduction 
                                                 
1 The Australian Immigration Department has undergone several name changes during the period of time that this paper addresses. 
For ease of reading, the authors use the generic ‘Immigration Department’ or ‘Department of Immigration’ throughout the paper. It 
appears in direct quotes from reports as DIMA (Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs), DIMIA (Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs) and DIC (Department of Immigration and Citizenship) – its current name. 
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In 1992, Australia implemented a policy of mandatory detention for all on-shore asylum seekers (Mares & 
Jureidini 2004) and in the same year, exempted the Migration Act 1958 from the passage of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Goggin & Newell 2005). Whilst promising an end to discrimination to the internal 
Australian disability population, discrimination against disabled people wishing to migrate remained protected 
in law. All immigration applicants, including asylum seekers, undergo substantial health checks as part of the 
qualification process. On-shore asylum seekers can be detained indefinitely while their refugee applications 
are determined, a process which may take from a few months to several years. The disabling effects of 
detention on adult asylum seekers have been well documented (Goggin & Newell 2005; Silove & Steel 1998; 
Steel & Silove 2001). The effects of detention on children have been extensively examined, including by 
Australia’s Human Rights Commission (HREOC 2004). A recent paper by psychiatrists Mares & Jureidini 
noted that almost all incarcerated children develop major depressive disorders including ‘recurrent thoughts of 
death and dying’ and that many ‘fulfilled the criteria for major depression with suicidal ideation’ (2004, 532). 
Little research, however, has been undertaken into the impact of Australia’s immigration policy on people 
with disabilities (Newell & Goggin 2005; Jakubowicz & Meekosha 2003) and even less, on lawful residents 
with a disability who have been held in Australia’s immigration detention centres.  
 
In this paper we draw on the findings of four Commonwealth Reports (Commonwealth Ombudsman Reports 
No. 3 2005; Commonwealth Ombudsman Reports No. 6 & 7 2006; Palmer 2005), to outline and discuss 
recent cases of wrongful detention and deportation of lawful Australian residents and citizens with disabilities. 
We then discuss Australian immigration policies and practices, bringing to the fore the intersection of 
disability and race discourses in reinforcing marginalisation and increasing the risk of serious human rights 
violations against people with disabilities from non-Anglo backgrounds. The data is drawn from several case 
studies to demonstrate that the issues raised by Mr G’s wrongful detention are neither isolated nor 
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idiosyncratic errors, but rather are the result of deep systemic, institutional and politico-cultural problems and 
argue that they need to be analysed in this broader context.   
 
Cornelia and Vivian: two stories 
In January 2005, a story appeared in The Age newspaper claiming that a woman called ‘Anna’, detained in 
Baxter Immigration detention centre had a severe mental illness and was being held in a high security 
compound of the Baxter, South Australian immigration detention centre called ‘Red One’ (Jackson 2005). 
The woman was Cornelia Rau, a permanent resident of Australia who had migrated to Australia when she was 
18 months old. Cornelia was only released from detention into a psychiatric ward in Adelaide, South Australia 
when her family recognised her from the newspaper article and identified her as a lawful resident.  
 
Cornelia Rau had been held as an ‘unlawful entrant’ for 10 months. The general public was shocked that a 
permanent resident with a mental illness could be incarcerated for such a long time leading to extensive public 
pressure for an inquiry. The government was reluctant to hold an inquiry and instead tried to swing the tide of 
public criticism through a series of public statements and press releases that placed the blame for Cornelia’s 
detention on Cornelia herself, not the immigration system, department or individual officers. These efforts to 
diffuse concern largely failed, and on 8 February 2005, the government announced a closed and limited 
inquiry into the matter to be conducted by former Australian Federal Police commissioner Mick Palmer 
(Vanstone 2005b). Palmer was given 6 weeks to conduct the inquiry and to report back to the Immigration 
Minister.  
 
During this time Australians learnt of the deportation of Vivian Alvarez Solon who had lived in Australia for 
18 years. Vivian Alvarez was an Australian citizen who had a mental illness and additionally sustained a head 
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injury and memory loss probably in an accident shortly before being found in a park at midnight. She was 
taken to Lismore Hospital, New South Wales on 30 March 2001 and was later transferred to a psychiatric 
clinic, where a social worker called the Immigration Department and said she suspected Vivian was an ‘illegal 
immigrant’. Immigration officers interviewed her on 3 May 2001 and assumed she had been trafficked into 
Australia as a sex worker. They did not complete comprehensive database searches for her name and instead 
began deportation proceedings. Vivian stated on a number of occasions that she was an Australian citizen, that 
she held an Australian passport and gave her correct name and date of birth, however, immigration officers 
persisted in their opinion that she was an unlawful non-citizen without conducting adequate searches based on 
information she gave, and on 20 July 2001, Vivian was deported to the Philippines (Crowley-Cyr 2005).  
 
Two years later Immigration Department officials, including senior officers both in Brisbane (Queensland) 
and Canberra (Australian Capital Territory) became aware of the wrongful deportation following enquiries 
from Queensland Missing Persons Unit. Officers took no action to assist Missing Persons to locate Vivian, to 
inform the Immigration Minister’s office, to seek to understand how such an error had been made or to rectify 
the situation.  
 
The failings of the Immigration Department were again front page news; how could an Australian citizen be 
deported? Like Cornelia, Vivian had a mental illness and was from a non-English speaking background. 
Additionally, Vivian was Filipino, an ethnic group stereotypically in Australia associated with mail order 
brides and sex workers (Cunneen and Stubbs 1996, Pettman 1997). Indeed first the social worker, and then the 
Immigration officers formed assumptions about Vivian’s illegal status in Australia, assumptions held so 




Intersections of disability and race in determining immigration detention 
In 2005 the Australian government referred a total of 248 cases of people found to have been wrongfully 
detained to the Commonwealth Ombudsman for investigation. Thirteen of the people had a disability. All 13 
cases were investigated and the finding were reported in five reports. The Palmer Inquiry (2005) addressed the 
circumstances of Cornelia’s detention. The Commonwealth Ombudsman reported individually on the 
circumstances of Vivian’s detention and deportation (2005, No 3) and the detention of Mr T (2006, No 4) and 
Mr G (2006, No 6) before deciding to report on the other cases in a single report titled ‘Report into Referred 
Immigration Cases: Mental health and incapacity’ (2006, No 7). The disabled people detained all had a 
learning difficulty, intellectual disability, acquired brain injury or a mental illness. Only one was from an 
Anglo-Celtic background (he was actually born in Australia and had never travelled out of the country). In 
most cases, the individuals concerned were unable to self-identify… 
The danger to be avoided is that an immigration officer will form a suspicion that a person is 
an unlawful non-citizen, when in fact the person is an Australian citizen or lawful resident 
who is unable to effectively communicate their status [emphasis added] (Commonwealth 
Ombudsman Report No. 7 2006, 2) 
 
… and in some cases such as Vivian, who did correctly identify herself, officials disregarded or disbelieved 
her testimony:   
Among the varied accounts Vivian gave about herself, there were two facts about which she 
was consistently accurate: all questions about her first name and her date of birth elicited the 
same correct responses—Vivian, born on 30 October 1962. (Commonwealth Ombudsman 




Personal assumptions and exercise of administrative powers 
The Inquiry recommends that in the training program for compliance and investigations officers 
there be a focus on objectivity in decision making and a strong warning that false assumptions 
will contribute to poor decisions. (Commonwealth Ombudsman Report No. 3 2005, 47) 
 
In all these cases it was the person’s ‘otherness’ that first drew them to the attention of authorities. That 
otherness was primarily about race; in 11 of 13 cases reported on by the Ombudsman ‘their different ethnicity 
was apparent’ (Ombudsman Report No. 7 2006, 2-3), combined with mental illness or intellectual disability. 
Whilst the White Australia Policy and associated slogans such as ‘Australia for the White man’ have been 
formally discarded, the underlying framework of Australian identity continues to maintain the centrality of 
whiteness as the norm against which otherness is measured.  
 
The Migration Act 1958 charges immigration officers with the responsibility of maintaining demographic 
border control and provides them with extensive administrative powers to enable them to perform their duties. 
Section 189 of the Act states that: 
If an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person in the migration zone (other than an 
excised offshore place) is an unlawful non-citizen, the officer must detain the person. (Migration 
Act 1958 s.189[1]) 
 
A ‘reasonable suspicion’ is one that is objectively reasonable: it cannot be founded on purely 




In all of the cases the detaining immigration officer formed a ‘reasonable suspicion’ which was significantly 
shaped by the officers’ ‘purely subjective or personal opinion[s]’. In the case of Vivian, one immigration 
officer made the assumption that she was a sex worker trafficked into Australia, an assumption which fellow 
officers shared and acted upon without any positive evidence to support the assumption and in fact, in the face 
of conflicting evidence.  
In relation to Vivian, one officer opined—without any supporting evidence—that Vivian might 
have been a ‘sex slave’. This opinion was repeated by other officers in subsequent reports and, in 
the Inquiry’s view, probably influenced to some extent the decisions made about Vivian. 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman Report No. 3 2005, 47) 
 
With each repetition of this assumption, it gained credibility and was soon taken as a ‘fact’. The words of 
immigration officers, though speculative, were given greater credibility in regard to Vivian’s immigration 
status than was her own testimony. This differential weighting of verbal testimony and the disregard of voices 
of disabled people was common across many of the cases examined. 
 
‘Reasonable suspicion’ to detain… 
Under the Migration Act 1958 a person is to be considered lawful until there is evidence to support an officer 
actively forming a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of unlawfulness. One of the primary reasons for this is that 
Australian born citizens who have not travelled outside Australia, do not appear on immigration data bases. 
Government departments are permitted to collect and maintain information about citizens only where that data 
is essential for the lawful functioning of that particular department. This is a cornerstone of liberal 
democracies based upon respect for the right of individuals to freedom from government intrusions upon their 
privacy (Nowak 2000). This places the onus on the immigration officer to prove that it is reasonable to 
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suspect that a person is unlawful and therefore subject to detention. In the absence of evidence of 
unlawfulness, a person is to remain free. As the Ombudsman noted in Vivian’s report ‘A properly based 
decision as to “reasonable suspicion” constitutes the only protection in the section against arbitrary detention.’ 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman Report No.3 2006, 47) 
 
In practice however, the operational culture of the Immigration Department has undermined this principle and 
reversed the onus of proof so that a person is considered to be unlawful unless they can positively prove 
otherwise. In all of these cases except one the person was not from an English speaking background and with 
the exception of Cornelia, was non-white and was unable to present full coherent and consistent information 
about their immigration status. Even though there was no actual evidence to suggest illegality, each person 
was assumed to be unlawful and was detained upon this assumption.  
 
The Ombudsman noted in Mr G’s report that:  
…some officers within DIMA held the view that if a person could not be conclusively identified 
and located on DIMA systems, the person had to be detained and kept in detention. 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman Report No.6 2006, 10) 
 
It is important to question the basis of the assumptions which lead to wrongful detention. We contend that the 
officers’ initial suspicions were raised due primarily to the person’s racial otherness. These suspicions may 
have been allayed earlier if the person had greater capacity to self-advocate. Their lawfulness was questioned 
due to their race whilst their ability to argue lawfulness was undermined by both the person’s ability to self-
advocate and by the officers’ assessment that their testimony was not credible as it did not sit comfortably 
within a Western rational ‘norm’. Had the detaining officers listened to each person and conducted further 
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investigations based upon this, the person’s proper identity and lawful status could have been discovered 
much sooner. Racism (in the initial formation of suspicion) and disability discrimination (in the maintenance 
of suspicion and silencing of disabled voices) were critical aspects of all these cases, aspects so far not 
adequately investigated. 
 
Immigration officers demonstrated significant subjectivity in the interpretation of evidence. Where that 
evidence supported their suspicion, the evidence was treated as credible. Mr A was left at a police station with 
a note pinned to his clothing alleging that he was an ‘illegal immigrant’. The police took him to hospital 
where he was treated for a suspected overdose and diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and major 
depression. Immigration officers interviewed him while he was recovering in hospital the following day and 
detained him (Commonwealth Ombudsman Report No. 7 2006, 6). This ‘evidence’ (the note pinned to his 
clothes) was in their minds, sufficient to warrant his detention. 
 
Evidence which countered the officers’ suspicion of unlawfulness was either disregarded or discredited. Mr G 
held a Commonwealth Bank book in his correct name, and several East Timorese community members 
vouched that he was a permanent resident. This information was not sufficient to gain his release. The 
Ombudsman identified this as a serious concern in his report on Mr G: 
 
….  [t]here is also evidence of a view prevailing at that time that DIMA could only release a person 
from detention if their identity had been proven and their lawfulness had been positively evidenced.  
… only a reasonable suspicion is required to detain a person but that absolute proof is required to 




… Absolute proof for release 
Section 191 of the Migration Act 1958 provides that a person must be released if there is evidence or it is 
reasonably believed that she/he is lawful. Mr G was detained on 28 August 2002. Six days later, on 3 
September 2002, 3 members of the East Timorese community attended Perth detention centre and identified 
Mr G as a permanent resident. The following day, the detention centre manager who lived in Fremantle also 
recognised Mr G and informed immigration officers in an email that he believed Mr G to be a lawful resident 
and therefore wrongly detained. Immigration officers did not reply to his email but did discuss amongst 
themselves the possibility that a lawful resident was being detained. On 4 September 2002 one officer wrote:  
... fortunately, Mr G is not educated enough to consider suing us for unjustified detention 
however, I think we need to be very careful in regard to how long we continue to detain him.  If 
released he will be easy enough to find if it is found that he is unlawful. (cited in Commonwealth 
Ombudsman Report No.6 2006, 10) 
 
Another replied: 
We have lawfully in the past detained Australian citizens until their status has been proven.  The 
duration is not an aspect.  The legality of the detention has been proven in the courts. (cited in 
Commonwealth Ombudsman Report No.6 2006, 10) 
 
The first officer interpreted Mr G’s intellectual disability, not as cause for increased duty of care, but rather as 
a protective factor against the department being sued. The second officer’s email demonstrates a profound 
lack of concern about a potentially wrongful detention and reflects the ‘deep-seated’ culture of the 
department. This exchange also highlights the operational culture that people were detained not until the 
‘reasonableness’ of the initial suspicion was called into question, but until their status had been proven. This 
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departmental culture demonstrates the need for external scrutiny of the exercise of administrative statutory 
power. The Palmer Report highlighted similar concerns arising from Cornelia’s detention noting that: 
DIMIA officers are authorised to exercise exceptional, even extraordinary powers. That they 
should be permitted and expected to do so without adequate… constraints on the exercise of these 
powers is of concern. (Palmer 2005, ix) 
 
Responding to Unruly Bodies  
There are many prisms through which human behaviour can be read. We have identified three categories of 
reading Cornelia’s (and by extension, other wrongly detained people’s) behavior: a punitive response; a 
medical response, and; a compassionate humanist response. The state, in all instances, acted in a punitive 
manner, enforcing and prolonging the individuals’ incarceration.  
 
Punitive: Deploying a criminal discourse 
Incomplete or inconsistent testimony, rather than being understood as an aspect of mental illness, was instead 
explained as ‘bad behaviour’ or ‘bad character’ and a punitive rather than compassionate response was 
evoked. The officers directly involved in each case were operating within a departmental and national culture 
obsessed with control and conformity (Grattan 2006 and Stratton 1998). The language used by Senator 
Vanstone, then Minister for Immigration, when responding to media inquiries about Cornelia highlight this 
discourse: 
I would urge those commenting and reporting on this case to consider the difficulties facing 
authorities in establishing the identity of someone who provides false information, provides no 




This is a tragic case, but one that has been resolved, giving comfort to the woman’s family, which 
has been concerned for her welfare since she absconded from a Sydney psychiatric ward last 
March. (Vanstone 2005a) 
 
During a prolonged episode of psychosis Cornelia used the name Anna. She displayed several behaviours 
which demonstrated her severe level of distress. Fellow detainees who witnessed these behaviours sent 
messages to supporters outside detention about their concerns that Cornelia was unwell and needed help rather 
than isolation. Senator Vanstone’s media comments however, present the explanation for Cornelia’s actions as 
bad behavior. By using terms such as ‘false information’, unwilling to assist’ and ‘abscond’ the Minister is 
drawing on a language of criminality, and thereby encouraging the public to see Cornelia’s detention as the 
fair and reasonable consequence of her (mis)behaviour.  
 
Given such comments made at the Ministerial level, it is little wonder that echoes are heard at the operational 
level. The interpreter for Mr G told immigration officers that she believed he ‘was lying and that he was born 
on an island off the West coast of Africa’ (Commonwealth Ombudsman Report No. 6 2006, 3). The 
immigration officer was prepared to believe this assertion and order the detention of Mr G without directly 
interviewing him either in person or by telephone. The pervasive culture of the Immigration Department was 
to see detainees as mischievous people of ‘bad character’ and given to lying. Again, Mr G’s inconsistent and 
incomplete testimony was invoked to explain his wrongful detention.  
 
Medical Authority: Pathologising or protecting? 
People working within Australia’s immigration system, particularly in the compliance and detention sections, 
are all too often trapped in didactic thinking and tend to read behaviour through either a pathologising medical 
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paradigm or through a criminal paradigm as discussed above. These two paradigms also interplay in complex 
and inconsistent ways. At times, medical pathology can function to support the criminalising of 
‘misbehaviour’. Notes from fellow detainees to refugee supporters highlight this coercive interplay: 
While Cornelia was in the Compound (sic) they brainwashed everyone to make them believe 
that she had no mental problem. They said that according to the psychologists report she plays 
her game very well. And she's a good actress and she just pretended to be crazy because she 
didn't want to be deported. (Immigration detainees cited in Smit 2005) 
 
Medical authority was deployed to give credibility to the guards’ assertions that Cornelia’s behaviour was 
manipulative and justified her incarceration in an isolation cell; it was no cause for concern or compassion. 
 
A medical discourse carries great authority as it draws upon a claimed ‘objective’ knowledge base with its 
associated acceptance of scientific ‘Truth’. However, the use of a medical discourse needs to be read 
alongside the ideological aims of the speaker. Just as politicians, immigration officers and guards have used 
the medical paradigm to support their assertions of criminality and the need for incarceration, so too have 
refugee activists used a medical discourse to argue for the dismantling of the detention system. Psychiatrists 
and other health professionals opposed to mandatory detention have researched, documented and argued that 
detention causes a range of disabling conditions (Mares and Jureidini 2004, Steel and Silove 2001, Sultan and 
O’Sullivan 2001). This has been one of the more powerful arguments against detention. The contradictory 
functions of medical authority in relation to detention demonstrate the problematic nature of objective truth 
claims and highlight the need to read ‘scientific facts’ in conjunction with the ideological position and 
purpose of the speaker. In one case, the state mobilises the power of medical discourses to further its 
ideological aims for achieving and maintaining racial and bodily homogeneity of the nation-state, whilst civil 
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society actors attempt to mobilise the authority of medical scientific discourses to counter the hegemonic 
dominance of the state. .  
 
Being Human: When oppressed meeting oppressed 
The recognition of Cornelia’s humanity and a compassionate response came from two oppressed groups – 
Aboriginal community members in far North Queensland and her fellow detainees; mostly asylum seekers 
from Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan also locked up in Baxter (Watkinson, Briskman and Fiske 2006). The asylum 
seekers recognised Cornelia’s need for help to get out of detention and were distressed by the treatment she 
was receiving. They sent out repeated calls for her help writing: 
I write this letter with shocking mind. I just return from Church service. There I met Anna. 
Initially I scared to talk to her hoping that she would ignore and misbehave due to her condition. 
In the Church service, she behaves very strangely very similar to downed mentally. I was worried 
that no one wanted to consult her or need to company her. Lately, I went and introduce myself and 
talk to her. She very gently asked to sit down in a bench and talk to me. Actually, she very nicely 
welcomed me. Then I understood that she need friends to talk and pass time. This treatment makes 
her situation worse… When we return from Church service, Van has come to bring her back to 
compound. She restricted to get in saying that she too need to walk like others and with them. I 
felt it is very fair and genuine request as human. We do the same when GSL restricted our 
moments (sic). That was the point I understood she need company. I don’t know what to do but 
felt very bad as human. We also not in good mentality but when we see worsen than us hard to 
bear. Still feel sympathy on them, which has remained with us yet (Immigration detainee cited in 




The immediacy and humanity of the language used by fellow detainees stands in stark contrast to the 
complex, scientific and hyper-rational language of the medical and immigration systems. Professional 
language here functions to dehumanise both ‘us’, the speakers, and ‘them’ the subjects, with our shared 
humanity and capacity for an emotional, direct ‘human to human’ response obscured through rationality. 
 
Standardising and homongenising the white able-bodied nation 
Historically within Australia, race and disability have been exclusionary categories (Gothard 1998). Non-
white people, along with people deemed disabled were both physically and morally removed from the demos; 
those people who are accepted as citizens with full political rights and freedoms within the nation state. The 
Australian demos, like other Western nations, was initially constructed around the white, property owning 
rational male body. European settlers in Australia viewed Indigenous Australians as a ‘backward race’ 
doomed to ‘die out’ (Jupp 1995). This belief was significantly informed by social Darwinism with its 
accompanying biological, moral and intellectual hierarchy of race, gender and ability. George Barton was a 
leading proponent of these ideas in Australia leading up to the time of Federation in 1901. He made ‘the much 
quoted suggestion that whites should “smooth the dying pillow” of the Aboriginal race’ (Wyndham 2003, 9). 
He was also the brother of Australia’s first Prime Minister, Edmond Barton, who presided over the passage of 
the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 which codified in law the formal exclusion of non-white and disabled 
people. 
 
The first act of Australia’s new Federal parliament was to pass the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 which 
was specifically designed to build and protect the racially and physically ‘pure’ ideal of the new nation 
(Bashford 2004). The Act while well known for its exclusion of non-white peoples, is less known for its 
exclusion of ‘any idiot or insane person’ and ‘any person suffering from an infectious or contagious disease of 
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a loathsome or dangerous character’ (Immigration Restriction Act 1901, Section 3 (e) (d), 1). Inclusion into 
the Australian demos was to be controlled; to create a nation built on a ‘desired’ up-standing citizen free from 
contagion (Gothard 1998; Meekosha and Dowse 1997). This desired citizen would be rational, white, able-
bodied, healthy and of ‘good moral character’. The criteria for assessing desirability were informed by both 
modern medicine and morality (Bashford 2004).  
 
Modern medicine was based upon pseudo-scientific constructions of biological superiority and inferiority, 
providing the rational framework for a hierarchy both of race and of able-bodiedness (Soldatic 2007). This 
paradigm was accepted uncritically as rational ‘objective truth’ and provided the ‘objective’ means for 
excluding certain people from the demos. The framework however was incomplete in itself and operated in 
conjunction with a discourse of morality rooted in Christianity. Christian morality was used to justify the 
exclusion of those who might meet the scientific criteria but who were nonetheless undesirable due to 
madness, idiocy, disease or ‘loathesome character’. This blatantly subjective framework gave discretion to 
individual officers to exclude people at the border.  
 
Groups have struggled for the broadening of the demos: women fought for suffrage and equal rights; 
Indigenous Australians continue to fight for recognition and equality; immigrant groups have also struggled 
for many years for their rights. People with disabilities have been excluded from the demos both through 
prohibition of immigration and, for those born here, through institutionalisation. Whilst the disability 
movement has made small gains in accessing citizenship rights, much remains to be achieved for people with 




The Immigration Restriction Act has now been replaced with the Migration Act 1958. This has meant some 
significant changes to racial criteria for entering Australia, and much of the racist and disablist language of the 
1901 Act has been removed. The 1958 Act however, maintains the notion of a ‘desirable’ citizen and excludes 
a range of bodies (Goggin and Newell 2005; Gothard 1998; Jakubowicz and Meekosha 2002; Meekosha and 
Dowse 1997). The Migration Act is formally exempt from the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 and 
discrimination against people on the basis of disability continues unabated. Medical checks are used to screen 
for a range of disabilities and a pseudo-scientific formula of the prospective financial cost to the Australian 
public is applied to determine entry (Goggin and Newell 2005; Jakubowicz and Meekosha 2002; Meekosha 
and Dowse 1997). These considerations over-ride humanist concerns such as keeping families together or 
protecting vulnerable peoples2. Medical science is still used as a primary foundation for exclusion, however it 
is now coupled with the new ‘science’ of economics, replacing Christian morality which has been exposed as 
overtly subjective. The primacy of ‘rational decision-making’ remains unexamined and unchallenged. 
 
Although the Migration Act replaced the Immigration Restriction Act in 1958, the White Australia Policy 
continued until the early 1970s when it was officially replaced with multiculturalism as the political 
framework informing immigration policy. Through the legislative changes, prevailing attitudes towards race 
and white superiority became divorced from the overtly racist language of the founding days of the Australian 
Federation, but the rationality underpinning notions of biological hierarchy remains. This rationality 
reverberates through policy and practice in the area of immigration for both disabled and non-white or non-
Christian people.  
                                                 
2 Sadly, there are several high profile cases of families being offered visas for all able-bodied family members but a disabled child 
for instance, being refused entry. One such case is the Kayani family which culminated in Mr Kayani committing suicide through 
self-immolation outside Parliament House in Canberra in protest at his forced separation from his daughter who had cerebral palsy 
(for more on this see Jakubowicz and Meekosha 2002). The second area where this policy has a major impact is in the area of 
refugee resettlement. The guiding principle is that resettling countries offer protection to those most vulnerable. However, Australia 
exclude prospective refugees with disabilities from consideration for resettlement though it is likely that a disability would increase 




Locked-out or locked-up: Concluding discussion 
The control of bodies is integral to constructing the nation state (Davies 2002). While immigration controls 
function to ‘lock-out’ people deemed undesirable, Australia uses policies of ‘locking-up’ people already 
within the geographical boundary who are deemed not desirable. Most Australians do not question the 
practice of detaining refugees and asylum seekers which resonates with the historical institutionalisation of 
people with disabilities. We have been well groomed to accept the sensibility of institutionalisation as a 
response to protecting the integrity of the demos.  
 
The Migration Act 1958 gives extraordinary powers to individual officers to deprive a person of her/his 
liberty with little administrative and no judicial oversight. In each of the cases discussed here, and arguably in 
many more beyond the scope of this paper, these powers have been used too readily and has caused little stir 
amongst the broader Australian community. The Ombudsman’s investigations to date focus almost 
exclusively on the operational application of migration regulations without examining the broader context in 
which they are shaped. Palmer noted his concern at the extraordinary powers given to immigration officers, 
the lack of protections against their misuse and that this misuse sat within a broader departmental culture that 
supported and perhaps encouraged street-level officers to zealously exercise detention powers.  
 
These cases raise important questions about both the laws and regulations of immigration and the political and 
socio-cultural environment which produces and reproduces these laws. Are we too willing to lock up people 
‘not like us’ and remove them from the demos? To what extent does the historically explicit desire for a 




Whilst we need a rigorous analysis of systems and powers that these systems delegate to individuals, we 
contend that the analysis needs to go further and recognise that Australia’s immigration, medical and other 
systems are products of Western society. A thorough investigation then, needs also to examine the often 
unnamed attitudes and values embedded within society, particularly how these homogenising forces act to 
exclude several groups of people in similar ways, whether it be disability, race, class, sexuality or other 
criteria. This investigation would include the socio-historical context of our political institutions with an aim 
to rectify the disconnect between the racist and disablist language of the past and the racist and disablist 
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